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Appellant-homeowner was convicted of
violating a zoning ordinance which pro-
hibited business operations in a residential
area. The incriminating evidence was ob-
tained by a building inspector, who, acting
pursuant to a village ordinance,' entered
petitioner's home without a warrant and
against his consent. In reversing the county
court, the New York Court of Appeals
held that a conviction for violating a zoning
ordinance which imposed criminal penal-
ties was a denial of due process if based
on illegally obtained evidence. People v.
Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 N.E.2d 441,
251 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1964).
The right of municipal authorities to in-
spect premises for possible violations of
regulatory ordinances concerning the pub-
lic health and safety has long been recog-
nized as a valid exercise of the police
The ordinance as far as it is relevant is set out
in the dissenting opinion of Judge Burke: "It
shall be the duty of the Building Inspector, and
he hereby is given authority, to enforce the pro-
visions of this ordinance. The Building Inspector
in the discharge of his duties shall have author-
ity to enter any building or premises at any
reasonable hour." People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d
304, 312, 200 N.E.2d 441, 445, 251 N.Y.S.2d
452, 458 (1964).
power.2 If the particular ordinance author-
izing a regulatory search afforded the indi-
vidual reasonable safeguards it was gen-
erally held valid. Thus, if an ordinance
provided that inspections take place only
during certain hours of the day and that
the scope of the inspection be limited, it
was thought that the rights of the individ-
ual were sufficiently protected.3
It appears that the other constitutional
limitations on searches and seizures were
not thought of as applying to regulatory
searches, or inspections as they later came
to be called.4 It did not seem logical or
practical to subject the termite inspector
to the same procedural limitations as were
imposed upon the policeman in pursuit of
a criminal. Thus a search warrant was not
2 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). See
generally Mitchell, Foreword to MULT. DWEL.
LAW at ix-xxi (McKinney 1946); Stahl & Kuhn,
Inspections and the Fourth Amendment, 11
U. PITT. L. REV. 256 (1950).
3 Frank v. Maryland, supra note 2, at 366-67;
City of St. Louis v. Evans, 337 S.W.2d 948, 958
(Mo. 1960); Sunderman v. Warnken, 251 Wis.
471, -, 29 N.W.2d 496, 498 (1947); COR-
NELIUS, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 35 (2d ed. 1926).
4 The distinctions between "searches" and "in-
spections" are discussed in FREUND, POLICE
POWER § 47 (1904) and Sunderman v. Warnken,
supra note 3. But see District of Columbia v.
Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), wherein
these distinctions are refuted.
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generally required to validate reasonable
search by an inspector acting under a
municipal ordinance. 5
It was not until 1949 that any real dis-
pute arose as to the validity of these in-
spections. In District of Columbia v.
Little I a federal appellate court held un-
constitutional a municipal ordinance penal-
izing a homeowner who had refused to ad-
mit a health inspector. Judge Prettyman
concluded: (1) that the basic premise of
the fourth amendment "was the common
law right of a man to privacy in his
home"; 7 (2) that Congress had never au-
thorized a search of a home without a war-
rant, save in those instances to be "ad-
judged solely by the extremity of the cir-
cumstances of the moment and not by any
characteristic of the officer or his mission";'
and (3) that to allow a criminal suspect
the protection of the fourth amendment
while denying it to a man not suspected
of a crime would be "a fantastic ab-
surdity."' The United States Supreme
Court affirmed on other grounds", and con-
sequently it was not until ten years later
that the Court was directly confronted with
the issue. In Frank v. Maryland," a case
involving a Baltimore health ordinance,"1
5 Stahl & Kuhn, supra note 2.
6 Supra note 4.
7 Id. at 16-17.
8 Id. at 16.
9 Id. at 17.
10 District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1
(1949).
11 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
12BALTIMORE CITY CODE, art. 12, § 120: "When-
ever the Commissioner of Health shall have
cause to suspect that a nuisance exists in any
house .. .he may demand entry therein in the
day time, and if the owner . . . shall refuse . ..
to . . .admit a free examination, he shall forfeit
and pay for every such refusal . . . Twenty
Dollars."
the inspector, in responding to a com-
plaint, detected evidence of the presence
of rats outside defendant's house and de-
manded entry. The homeowner refused to
admit him and as a result was convicted
of a civil violation of the ordinance. The
Court, with no reference to the Little case,
held that where the demands of the public
welfare outweigh the interest of an indi-
vidual's privacy, inspections are to be al-
lowed.
Both Mr. Justice Frankfurter, represent-
ing the majority, and Mr. Justice Douglas,
writing the dissent, sought to determine the
intent of the framers of the Constitution in
light of the events surrounding the passage
of the fourth amendment. The majority
found that this provision related primarily
to criminal matters and that the right to be
secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures was based upon an interrelation-
ship of the fourth amendment and fifth
amendment guarantees against self-incrim-
ination.13
However, the dissent argued that "the
fourth amendment has a much wider frame
of reference than mere criminal prosecu-
tions,' '14 and that "the security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police . . . is at the core of the fourth
amendment. . . .",5 Mr. Justice Douglas,
endorsing and expanding upon the holding
in Little, stated that whatever the purpose
of a public official, he is still subject to
constitutional limitations on his activity.
It is not a question of balancing inter-
ests, because the police power cannot be
superimposed upon the Constitution. So
much as a warrant "hobbles" an inspector
"3Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 364-65
(1959).
14 Id. at 377.
'5 Id. at 375.
in enforcing the law, it "hobbles" a police-
man, and where there are conflicts be-
tween public enforcement and the rights
of the individual, they must be resolved in
favor of the latter.
Thus, the majority, fearing the un-
checked growth of slums in an increasingly
complex society, sustained the validity of
the ordinance, while the dissent, envision-
ing the disguise of policemen in inspectors'
clothing and the growing power of govern-
ment leading to further sacrifices of the
rights of the individual, considered it un-
constitutional. Also, there is apparent dis-
agreement as to the status of the inspector,
i.e., whether he is in essence a peace of-
ficer. If it is found that he is not, there is
the further question of whether it logically
follows that the inspector should be given
broader latitude under the fourth amend-
ment.
Despite the comprehensive handling of
the issues raised, neither side to the dispute
got beyond the issue of the validity of
health and safety inspections without a
warrant., The majority did not define the
limits and scope of these inspections, and
the dissent did not discuss the problems in-
volved in placing such inspections within
the traditional pattern of search warrant
requirements.
A situation somewhat analogous to that
in Frank arose in the instant case.'0 How-
ever, there are significant differences be-
tween these two cases. The principal case
involved a zoning ordinance as opposed to
a health ordinance; an unconsented-to en-
try resulting in fine and imprisonment as
16 There are three common characteristics of the
two cases: an administrative ordinance, enacted
to promote the public health and safety, and
providing for regulatory inspection without the
requirement of a search warrant.
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opposed to a refusal of entry resulting in
fine; and a seemingly arbitrary entry con-
trasted with an entry upon probable cause.
The first difference is not generally con-
sidered significant in "regulatory inspection
cases," nor was it so considered in the in-
stant case. The second is the basis for the
majority opinion, and the third the ground
for the special concurrence by Judge Des-
mond. The dissenting judges saw none of
the distinctions as operative and found
Frank to be controlling.
The majority opinion placed reliance
upon the statement by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in Frank that "inspections without
a warrant as an adjunct to a regulatory
scheme for the general welfare . . . and
not as a means of enforcing the criminal
law" have long been recognized. 17 Judge
Bergan pointed out that this entry resulted
in a criminal conviction based upon the
fruits of an official search without a war-
rant and as such was controlled by Mapp
v. Ohio.'8 Thus, the evidence gathered
was erroneously admitted in the court be-
low. The Court distinguished the Frank
case because it did not involve a search
leading to a criminal conviction. The Court
found that all inspections are only "prob-
ably valid" and that the defendant argued
"with some force" that every entry with-
out a warrant is invalid. But this is not
explained, apparently because it was con-
sidered extraneous to the holding. It is
17 People v. Laverne, supra note 1, at 308, 200
N.E.2d at 443, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 455, citing
Frank v. Maryland, supra note 13, at 367.
is 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The majority of state
courts take the view that a violation of an
ordinance cannot constitute a crime. CLARK &
MARSHALL, CRIMES § 1 (5th ed. 1952). But
some courts have held that violation of a muni-
cipal ordinance designed to protect health and
safety is a crime. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW § 12
(1934).
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intimated, however, that the Court thought
that the holding of Frank rested on tenuous
grounds and should be applied restrictively.
Judge Desmond, in his concurring opin-
ion, found that the absence of the necessity
of "reasonable grounds" made the ensuing
inspection unreasonable and the ordinance
invalid. Since the Chief Judge concurred
"solely . . . on this ground,"19 it appears
that on all the other substantive matters
he was in agreement with the dissent.
Only the dissent sought to expand upon
the broad problems raised in Frank. Judge
Burke disagreed with both the basic
premise and conclusion of the majority. He
stated that a criminal conviction was not
herein involved, but rather a violation of
a municipal ordinance whose sanctions are
analogous to "offenses" and merely re-
semble the criminal law. Finding the entry
itself valid, the condition which eventually
was used as evidence to convict the de-
fendant, obviously, was admissible against
him.
Thus, it would seem that the minority
in Laverne captured, and the majority ig-
nored, the essential meaning of Frank. The
reason for the Court's reaching a decision
inconsistent with Frank may be attributed
to its fundamental uncertainty as to the
force of that case as precedent. The cur-
rent tendency of the Supreme Court to
expand upon the protections of the rights
of the individual and the close division of
the Court in that case intimate that Frank
might be overruled. The Mapp case repre-
sents the key turn in that direction. Al-
though it implicitly seemed to mitigate the
Frank holding, it did not specifically ad-
dress itself to that area. Thus, it is not clear
19 People v. Laverne, supra note 1, at 310, 200
N.E.2d at 444, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
to what extent the earlier case is still bind-
ing. This perhaps explains the reference by
the Court to inspections as only "probably
valid," and to the proposition that the
Constitution denies all entries without a
warrant as an argument "with some force."
The Court, in applying the Mapp holding
within the Frank framework, tried to ad-
here to the rule of stare decisis while
deciding consistently with the anticipated
change of law.
The holding of the instant case makes
it mandatory that all public ordinances
which authorize administrative inspections
without a search warrant and impose a
criminal penalty be revised.
Perhaps the more significant effect of
the case is that it casts doubt on the
validity of all administrative inspections
performed without a warrant, regardless
of the penalty. If, when they acknowledged
that the Constitution prohibits all entries
without a warrant as an argument "with
some force," the Court meant that even
inspections authorized by ordinances simi-
lar to that in Frank are invalid in New
York; this makes the present procedure for
enforcing these ordinances inadequate.
There is no provision, either in New
York or in the federal law, whereby a war-
rant may be obtained by an inspector. But
even supposing there were such provisions,
how could an inspector get one? 20 Perhaps
in those inspections begun by a civilian
complaint or by the suspicion of an in-
spector, the requirement of a warrant
might be met.2 1 But what of the systematic
area-by-area inspection, where an inves-
tigation is being made to discover unsafe
conditions? How is the inspector to de-
20 SOBEL, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF
SEARCH & SEIZURE 14, 73 (1964).
21 See 33 TEMP. L.Q. 99 (1959).
termine in advance whether he will un-
cover a condition which will demand a
punitive sanction? How is he to have the
requisite probable cause to detect in-
ternally-caused rodent decay?
Description of the mechanics of an in-
spection illustrates this difficulty. Regula-
tory inspection generally proceeds in two
stages: discovery and enforcement. Upon
uncovering a dangerous condition, the in-
spector informs the party of the condition
and directs him to correct it. Some time
later he returns to see if there has been
compliance. If there has not been, a
penalty is imposed. But when in this chain
of events could a warmnt (if one were
obtainable) have been obtained? Before
the first entry there is no cause to suspect
a violation, and before the second the
"probable cause" is based upon the first,
and any incriminating evidence subse-
quently obtained is inadmissible.
Thus, if we apply the intimations of
the majority literally, administrative in-
spections, other than those where the
threat to the public welfare is an accom-
plished fact and probable cause obviously
exists, are impossible. This conclusion is
unreasonable as administrative inspections
are essential in today's society. The courts
will have to recognize this fact and allow
such inspections on something less than
probable cause. Although something less
than the requirement of probable cause is
a practical necessity, it will be necessary
to add substantial safeguards to the mini-
mum requirements of Frank v. Maryland.
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This conclusion seems warranted by the
trend of recent Supreme Court cases in this
area, particularly Mapp v. Ohio.
Many different solutions may be pos-
sible.2 2 What additional safeguards will be
required by the courts as an essential mini-
mum is difficult to determine in the ab-
sence of judicial decision. It is suggested,
as one of the many conceivable alterna-
tives, that the legislature authorize the issu-
ance of an "inspection warrant" on less
than probable cause. In order to meet con-
stitutional objections, it is further suggested
that the inspections be allowed only at
certain times of the day, that the area to
be inspected be limited and that they occur
only at fixed intervals.
In these cases, where probable cause
to believe a violation has occurred is not
present, a systematic area-by-area inspec-
tion made every five years, conducted with
the above safeguards, does not seem to
be an undue deprivation of the citizen's
liberty.
22 It does not appear that there have been any
concrete suggestions as to how a new system
might be effected. There is some evidence, how-
ever, that the most economical method of en-
forcing housing regulations is by a planned
coverage of significant areas. Pond, Need for
Systematic Evaluation of Substandard Housing,
37 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 967, 968 (1947). It
has also been claimed that this is the most effec-
tive method, based upon the results of a report
from five cities where such investigations were
practiced. Stahl & Kuhn, supra note 2, relying
upon Systematic Inspection of Substandard Hous-
ing, 63 AM. CITY 82 (1948).
